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Police Liability for Invasion of Privacy
Mildred Schad*
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property. .... 1
T HE RIGHT TO PRIVACY is not specifically spelled out as such in the
Constitution of the United States, but the Fourth Amendment does
guarantee the right of a person to be secure in his "person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures. . . ." Inclusion of
the Amendment was a rejection of the British general warrants.2 These
were blanket warrants that authorized the King's representative to in-
vade a person's home and search for any evidence that might be in-
criminating. 3 But, until 1961,4 the Supreme Court had felt that the
founding fathers only wanted to restrict invasions by the federal gov-
ernment,5 not unreasonable searches and seizures by state governments.6
Evidence illegally seized by a federal officer was admissible in a state
court, and evidence illegally seized by a state officer was admissible in a
federal court.7 It was not until 1960 that this "silver platter" doctrine
was invalidated.8 And then, in 1961, the Supreme Court decided Mapp
v. Ohio9 and made the federal exclusionary rule of illegally seized evi-
dence applicable to the states via due process in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
No reasonable man would contend that there can be no valid in-
vasion of privacy by police officers. But, just when do the rights of
society accede to the privileges of the individual? The Supreme Court did
not attempt to lay down a fixed formula in Mapp, but rather realized
that it would be met with recurring questions of the reasonableness of
a search. 10 The Supreme Court further stated that findings of reason-
ableness should be determined in the first instance by the trial court
* B.S., Ohio Univ.; Fourth-Year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of
Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); People v. Adams, 276 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636(1903).
6 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
7 Elkins v. U.S., 363 U.S. 206 (1960).
8 Ibid.
9 Supra n. 4.
10 Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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and that they will be respected insofar as they are consistent with
federal constitutional guarantees.1 1
Certain guides as to the reasonableness of a search have been de-
termined. A search, without a search warrant, is lawful if it is incident
to a lawful arrest and if the essential element of a lawful arrest, prob-
able cause,12 exists.
The Pre-Mapp Remedy
Before Mapp v. Ohio,13 many states applied the exclusionary rule
to evidence seized by an illegal search and seizure. The only remedy
available in those states that rejected the exclusionary rule was a tort
action for damages. 14
The mere fact that a man is an officer gives him no greater right
than a private citizen to break in upon the privacy of a home with-
out a legal warrant. And, no amount of incriminating evidence will
suffice in the stead of a legal warrant. 15
If a warrant is illegal on its face, the officer executing it is personally
liable for damages.' 6 If a search warrant is valid on its face and properly
executed, no cause of action will lie, even though the alleged articles
are not found.17 A police officer executing a warrant issued by the
clerk of the police court, not by a judge with proper jurisdiction, was
held personally liable for damages.1s Another court would not protect
a police officer from the consequences of executing a search warrant
procured through his own fraud and misdoing. The defendant filled in
a search warrant that had been signed in blank by a judge.' 9 Courts
will not protect officers who execute a legal search warrant in an un-
reasonable manner.20 Reasonableness can only be determined by con-
sidering all of the circumstances, and the division between reasonable-
ness and unreasonableness is by zone, rather than by definite line, within
which reasonable men may differ. Thus, the court felt that a properly
issued warrant to search for intoxicating liquors did not give police
officers the right to tear out sections of walls using an axe and crowbar.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., Rios v. U.S., 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 98 (1959); People v.
Stewart, 232 Mich. 670, 206 N.W. 337 (1925); Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
Weeks v. U.S., supra n. 5; Golliher v. U.S., 362 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966).
13 Supra n. 4.
14 Wolf v. Colorado, supra n. 6.
15 McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 370, 98 N.W. 881, 883 (1904).
16 Gruman v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 6 Am. Dec. 200 (1814); Banfill v. Byrd, 122 Miss.
288, 84 So. 227 (1920).
17 24 R.C.L. 699.
18 Banfill v. Byrd, supra n. 16.
19 Bull v. Armstrong, 48 So.2d 467 (Ala. 1950).
20 Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Me. 56, 71 A. 70 (1908).
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A police officer is liable civilly if he acts beyond the law, even if
he is acting under his superior's orders to frisk anyone coming under
police suspicion as part of a campaign to combat an increase in crimes
involving deadly weapons. 2 1
If a police officer enters the home of another, without a warrant,
for the purpose of searching the home, and the occupant does not consent
to the search, the officer is a trespasser and liable for damages. No
amount of suspicion or incriminating evidence can justify such a search.22
And, after making a valid arrest, an officer does not have the right to
return and forcibly enter a home without a warrant, even if he has
actual knowledge that the goods sought are in the home. 23
An unreasonable search and seizure is a private wrong subject to a
private redress, so if a police officer forcibly searches a person or com-
pels him to submit to a search, then the police officer becomes a tres-
passer. In such a case, the state has no legal connection with the wrong
and no agency in it.24 If an arrest is illegal, then, the ensuing
frisk leaves the police officer open to a suit for damages.2 5 Also liable
for damages are any persons who aid a police officer in the execution
of an illegal search and seizure, even if they do not have any reason to
believe that the officer is acting beyond the scope of his authority.2
Jurisdictions differ as to the liability of persons who causes war-
rants to issue. The Supreme Court of Oregon has stated that anyone
who maliciously or without probable cause induces a search warrant
to issue is liable for damages for the search sustained.27 The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, however, has said that the person requesting the
warrant does not determine if probable cause exists. Rather, the magis-
trate makes this determination. Thus, even if the person who requests
the warrant, executes the search, he' is not liable if the warrant is not
issued for probable cause. 28
Defenses
Consent is a complete defense of an illegal search and seizure,29
but jurisdictions differ as to what constitutes consent. In Fennemore
v. Armstrong,30 the court stated that even if the occupant's reason for
21 Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954).
22 Fennemore v. Armstrong, 29 Del. 35, 96 A. 204 (1915).
23 Gamble v. Keyes, 35 S.D. 644, 153 N.W. 888 (1915).
24 Ex parte City of Mobile, 251 Ala. 539, 38 So.2d 330 (1949).
25 Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Mason v. Wrightson, supra n. 21.
26 Cartwright v. Canode, 138 S.W. 792 (Texas 1911).
27 Shaw v. Moon, 117 Ore. 558, 245 P. 318 (1926); Nally v. Richmond, 105 Ore. 462,
209 P. 871 (1922).
28 Knisley v. Ham, 39 Okl. 623, 136 P. 427 (1913).
29 Fennemore v. Armstrong, supra n. 22.
30 Supra n. 22.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1967
POLICE AND PRIVACY
consenting was that he believed the officer had a valid warrant, any
action for trespass would be waived. Other jurisdictions have asserted
that a citizen is not required to resist an officer in order to maintain
an action against unlawful search and seizure. An officer armed with
an illegal warrant cannot defend on the ground of consent unless it
appears that the consent was freely given and that it was not given be-
cause of the officer's official authority or under color of process. 31 It
cannot be said that a person voluntarily consented to be searched where
the person was not informed of her constitutional rights, was illegally
detained by police, and saw her companions beaten for resisting arrest.
3 2
That a person was a thief, or did in fact have the stolen property
in his possession, is no justification to an unlawful search.3 3 And that
police officers acted in good faith is not a defense to a civil action against
them as they are judged by their conduct, not their motives.34
Damages
Damages occasioned by a wilful wrong cannot always be measured
by the consequent loss of money. The damage is often mental, not
physical and, thus, must be assumed from such a wrong.3 5 To prove
damages resulting from an unlawful search and seizure, evidence tend-
ing to show humiliation, injury to feelings, and disgrace is admissible.30
Exemplary damages may be awarded if malice can be shown.37
Generally, however, a finding of exemplary damages must be predi-
cated on a finding of actual damages. Exemplary damages are a form
of punishment awarded by the jury in its discretion as a means of re-
taliating against a defendant for his anti-social behavior and to deter
others from so acting in the future. Such damages do not constitute
the basis for a cause of action, and some courts hold that if the jury
assesses only a nominal sum, exemplary damages cannot be recovered.
Other courts permit exemplary damages to be recovered even if the
damages assessed are nominal, as they feel it is evident that the plain-
tiff has a valid cause of action.38 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
permitted the recovery of exemplary damages where the plaintiff could
31 Banfill v. Byrd, supra n. 16; Bull v. Armstrong, supra n. 19.
32 State v. DeKoenigswarter, 54 Del. 388, 177 A.2d 344 (1962).
33 McClurg v. Brenton, supra n. 15.
34 Buckley v. Beaulieu, supra n. 20.
35 Krehbiel v. Henkle, 152 Iowa 604, 129 N.W. 945 (1911).
36 Shall v. Minneapolis St. P. &. S.S.M. Ry. Co., 156 Wisc. 195, 145 N.W. 649 (1914).
37 Fennemore v. Armstrong, supra n. 22; 24 R.C.L. 699; Buckley v. Beaulieu, supra
n. 20; Krehbiel v. Henkle, supra n. 35.
38 Note, Necessity of Actual Damages For An Award of Exemplary Damages, 17
Iowa L. Rev. 413, 1931-32.
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show no actual damages other than the humiliation sustained by the
unlawful search.3 9
Courts also differ as to what evidence is admissible in mitigation of
damages. In McClurg v. Brenton,4" the court held that only such evi-
dence as tends to show good faith and absence of malice is admissible.
This evidence should be admissible to mitigate exemplary damages,
not for the purpose of assessing actual or compensatory damages. Other
jurisdictions feel that reasonable suspicion by the police officer will
mitigate damages.4 I
In Banfill v. Byrd,42 for the purpose of mitigating damages, the
court stated it would admit evidence showing the reputation of the plain-
tiff for bad character or the general reputation of her hotel as being
an evil place. This evidence would be admissible on the theory that a
person with a generally bad reputation has little to lose and is therefore
entitled to little compensation.
In Bucher v. Krause43 punitive damages were allowed even though
no evidence of malice was introduced, as Illinois courts permit the
assessment of punitive damages when a wrongful act is performed with
reckless disregard for the rights of others.
Invasion of Privacy by Federal Agents
The federal government and its agents appear to be immune from
a tort action for damages sustained by an illegal search and seizure. In
Bell v. Hood,44 the court stated that federal officers could not be sued
as individuals because the Fourth Amendment only applies to the fed-
eral government and its agents. And, federal officers cannot be sued
in their capacities as federal agents as the Federal Tort Claims Act pro-
hibits suits arising from false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
and interference with contract rights. This immunity extends to all
federal officers acting within the scope of their duties. However, the
court did point out that where a federal agent exceeds his authority, he
no longer represents the government and, thus, loses his immunity.
Value of the Tort Remedy
Civil action against a police officer as a remedy to an illegal
search and seizure is ineffective. The jury sees before it a plaintiff who
has either been convicted of a crime or who has been suspected of one
39 Mason v. Wrightson, supra n. 21.
40 Supra n. 15.
41 24 R.C.L. 699.
42 Supra n. 16.
43 Supra n. 25.
44 71 F.Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
Sept., 1967
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1967
POLICE AND PRIVACY
versus a defendant whose major fault is over-zealousness. 45 Further,
an unlawful breach of privacy is complete and irreparable when per-
petrated. Restoring to the injured party that which was in his possession
would at least partially restore him to his previous position.4" But, if
the injured party is convicted by the use of evidence that was unlaw-
fully seized, how can a judgment for money damages even partially
restore him to his previous position?
Also, the police officer is in an imminently better position to de-
fend a suit than the plaintiff is to initiate it. Statutes generally provide
that salaries of a civil servant cannot be garnished in the event of a civil
suit, that a municipal officer may be reimbursed even though he has
exceeded his authority or committed an illegal act, and that he may be
defended without cost. But who helps the plaintiff? 47
The only remedy of real value to the plaintiff is the recognition of
his constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. The
realization of this right, culminating in Mapp v. Ohio,48 developed
gradually as the courts came to recognize the inadequacy of money
damages as a remedy and the impotence of the tort cause of action as a
deterrent.
In a recent case, the police sought to justify more than three hun-
dred illegal searches in nineteen days by improperly issued warrants
for the arrest of two men. In issuing an injunction to restrain the
police officers from conducting unlawful searches, the U. S. Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit, pointed out that the case at hand did not in-
volve individual officers in isolated instances, but the whole police de-
partment as part of a plan.4 9
It was one thing to condone an occasional constable's blunder, to
accept his illegally obtained evidence so that the guilty would not
go free. It was quite another to condone a steady course of illegal
police procedures that deliberately and flagrantly violated the Con-
stitution of the United States as well as the state constitution.50
An action for damages for unlawful search and seizure is an illu-
sory remedy.5 1 Even if a plaintiff is able to gain a substantial verdict,
he must face the lack of the policeman's finances, which often makes
the verdict useless as a municipality is not liable without its consent.
The threat of a suit for damages has not deterred police officers
from executing illegal searches and seizures. The only effective deter-
45 Blumrosen, Contempt of Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 Rutgers L. Rev.
526, 1956-57.
46 Eleuteri v. Richman, 47 N. J. Super. 1, 135 A.2d 191 (1957).
47 Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L. J. 144, 1948-49.
48 Supra n. 4.
49 Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
50 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 3 Duke L. J. 319, 322 (1962).
51 Wolf v. Colorado, supra n. 6.
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rent is excluding the fruits of unlawful searches as evidence in the
courtroom as it appears that only by making the breaking of a law
fruitless, can we uphold the right to be free from illegal searches and
seizures.
The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter
violations of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which
excludes illegally obtained evidence. Only by exclusion can we im-
press upon the zealous prosecutor that violation of the Constitu-
tion will do him no good. And only when that point is driven home
can the prosecutor be expected to emphasize the importance of
observing constitutional demands in his instructions to the police.
52
52 Id. at 44.
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